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OF THE CONDUCT OF THE

UNDERSTANDING

“Quid tam[1] temerarium tamque indignum sapientis gravitate atque constantiâ, quam aut falsam sentire, aut quod non satis exploratè perceptum sit, et cognitum, sine ullâ dubitatione defendere?”

Cic. de Natura Deorum, lib. i.

1. Introduction.—The last resort a man has recourse to, in the conduct of himself, is his understanding; for though we distinguish the faculties of the mind, and give the supreme command to the will, as to an agent, yet the truth is, the man, who is the agent, determines himself to this or that voluntary action, upon some precedent knowledge, or appearance of knowledge, in the understanding. No man ever sets himself about anything but upon some view or other, which serves him for a reason for what he does: and whatsoever faculties he employs, the understanding, with such light as it has, well or ill informed, constantly leads; and by that light, true or false, all his operative powers are directed. The will itself[2], how absolute and uncontrollable soever it may be thought, never fails in its

  1. Quid tam, etc. “What so rash and so unworthy of the dignity and consistency of a wise man as to hold a false opinion, or to defend without any hesitation that which has been perceived and accepted as true without sufficient examination.”
  2. The will itself, etc. The theory of volition here briefly outlined is fully considered in the “Essay concerning the Human Understanding,” Bk. II, ch. xxi. § 29.