different times by different English philosophers in senses so various, that, until our philosophical terminology has by universal consent attained far greater precision than at present, it must always be difficult for the writer or translator to convey to the reader s mind precisely the same thought that was in his own. To prevent unnecessary confusion however, by leaving too much to chance, I will here briefly state those terms which give most latitude for misappre hension, explaining the sense in which I employ them and also the special meaning attached to some of them by Schopenhauer, who often differs in this from other writers. They are as follows.
(a.) Anschauung (anschauen, literally 'to behold') I have rendered differently, according to its double meaning in German. When used to designate the mental act by which an object is perceived, as the cause of a sensation received, it is rendered by perception. When used to lay stress upon immediate, as opposed to abstract representation, it is rendered by intuition. This last occurs however more often in the adjective form.
(b.) Vorstellung (vorstellen, literally 'to place before') I render by representation in spite of its foreign, unwelcome sound to the English ear, as being the term which nearest approaches the German meaning. The faculty of representation is defined by Schopenhauer himself as "an exceedingly complicated physiological process in the brain of an animal, the result of which is the consciousness of a picture there."
(c.) Auffassung (auffassen, literally 'to catch up') has so many shades of meaning in German that it has to be translated in many different ways according to the relation in which it stands in the context. It signifies apprehension, comprehension, perception, viewing and grasping.
(d.) Wahrnehmung (wahrnehmen, from wahr, true, and nehmen, to take), is translated by apprehension or perception,
