any person who lives by his daily exertion. The consequence of combination has then, in these instances, been, to the workmen who combined—reduction of wages; to the public—reduction of price; and to the manufacturer—increased sale of his commodity, resulting from that reduction.
(365.) It is, however, important to consider the effects of combination in another and less obvious point of view. The fear of combination amongst the men whom he employs, will have a tendency to induce the manufacturer to conceal from his workmen the extent of the orders he may at any time have received; and, consequently, they will always be less acquainted with the extent of the demand for their labour than they otherwise might be. This is injurious to their interests; for instead of foreseeing, by the gradual falling-off in the orders, the approach of a time when they must be unemployed, and preparing accordingly, they are liable to much more sudden changes than those to which they would otherwise be exposed.
In the evidence given by Mr. Galloway, the engineer, he remarks, that, "When employers are competent to show their men that their business is steady and certain, and when men find that they are likely to have permanent employment, they have always better habits, and more settled notions, which will make them better men, and better workmen, and will produce great benefits to all who are interested in their employment."
(366.) As the manufacturer, when he makes a contract, has no security that a combination may not arise amongst the workmen, which may render that contract a loss instead of a benefit; besides
