of a few scientists is readily recognized by others; large groups of competently trained men can be assigned to exploiting the theory for purposes of practical application; and the public unquestioningly accepts the results as exemplified by sputniks or new weapons of destruction.
The situation is very different in the field which, by way of contrast to the natural sciences, the Japanese call the “humanistic sciences.” In this field no theory can ever be established with the certainty that is commonplace in the natural sciences. Even the most widely held theories will not be accepted by all competent judges, nor are they accepted as being the whole truth even by those who believe in them. Moreover, even when there is general agreement among specialists, a theory cannot be successfully applied to practical problems unless the general public understands and approves what is being done. The average man, recognizing his own ignorance of the natural sciences, is usually willing to accept the opinion of the expert in this field, but, the same man, regardless of his ignorance or, more correctly, in direct proportion to the depth of his ignorance, feels himself an expert on all human matters, simply because of his membership in the human species.
This difference in the attitude of people toward problems in the natural sciences and the “humanistic sciences” does not bother dictatorial governments. In these, policies are established by a small group of leaders and the experts they choose to trust, and the opinions of people in general do not count. In a democracy, however, the unwillingness of the public to accept without question the consensus of experts on human affairs presents grave problems. This is particularly true in a country like ours in which we have translated our strong desires for political equality into a distrust of all unusual knowledge or capacity. Special knowledge of some aspect of human affairs, instead of being accorded special respect, is often considered suspect just because it is not average knowledge.
The result of this situation is that we make effective use of such expert knowledge as we have on human affairs only in those fields in which the general public is reasonably well informed. In domestic matters, general knowledge naturally runs high, because we all live in and are part of the United States. The gap between specialized knowledge and general knowledge is not serious in this field. In foreign affairs, however, the level of general knowledge is naturally much lower, and our use of specialized knowledge is therefore much less effective. We do much better in foreign areas that the American people know relatively well than in areas about which there is not much general understanding. Our record in Europe, for example, is very much better on the whole than our record in Asia, for the
