which was one of the duties imposed upon him by his instructions.
After the battle of Plassy, the Nabob, Meer Jaffier, had granted to the English troops whom he was to support double batta, or field allowance. When the mode of defraying the expenses of the army was changed, by the assignment to the Company of certain districts for the purpose, the Court of Directors ordered that double batta should be abolished. These instructions, though often repeated, had never been carried into effect; and it remained for Clive to enforce orders which apathy, or fear, or inclination, had previously permitted to slumber. The select committee accordingly issued an order, directing that from the 1st of January, 1766, double batta should cease, except at Allahabad; where, on account of the distance from Calcutta, the allowance was to be continued while the troops were actually in the field, but was to be reduced to single batta when they retired into cantonments. At Patna and Mongheer the troops were to have half batta when not on service. At the Presidency they were to be placed on the same footing as at Madras; they were to draw no batta, except when actually marching or serving in the field.
Against this order, remonstrance was offered, but in vain. It was enforced, and led to a wide-spread conspiracy among the European officers, organised with much care and great secrecy, the object of which was the simultaneous resignation of their commissions on a given day. Clive exerted himself vigorously to repress the mutinous movement; he was ably supported by Sir Robert Barker, and Colonel A. Smith, who commanded two of the three brigades into which the army was divided. The remaining brigade was commanded by Sir Robert Fletcher; and he, it was discovered, though not until the mutiny was very far advanced, was the contriver and instigator of the guilty proceedings. He was brought to a court-martial, convicted, and cashiered. A few officers of inferior rank were also brought to trial,
