very brink of that river could be reached only by crossing its channel. The fortifications at the first point, however, appeared both strong and complicated; while the most western angle projected beyond the main body of the fortress, and was not duly flanked, or protected by the other defences. Besides, while regularly attacked from the south, it could be enfiladed from the northern bank of the Cauvery. The river, too, was fordable there; and it was confidently expected that, before the moonsoon had augmented its waters, the campaign would be over. In pursuance of these views, General Stuart crossed the stream, and succeeded in gaining a position on the northern bank in which he could effectually co-operate with the main attack.
The siege was now vigorously pressed. On the 20th and 26th two strongly-intrenched posts that guarded the approaches to the wall were carried by attacks under the direction, the one of Colonel Sherbrooke, and the other of Colonel Wellesley. On the 22nd the garrison had made a sortie, and fell in considerable force on the Bombay army; but their sustained efforts were repulsed, and they were driven into the town with a loss of six hundred men. Between this and the 28th some communications passed between Tippoo and General Harris, with a view to an accommodation; but the draft of preliminaries forwarded by the latter was so unfavourable, and so pertinaciously adhered to, as put a final stop to all communication between them. The British ultimatum called upon Tippoo for the cession of half his dominions, the payment of two crores of rupees, one immediately, and another in six months; with the delivery of four of his sons, and four of his principal chiefs, as hostages. On perusing this answer, the energies of the Sultan seemed entirely to fail. Yielding to despair and grief, rather than rage, he sank into a state of stupor, alternating with paroxysms of extravagant and groundless exultation. He no longer took any steady view of his danger, or
