Page:Our Indian Army.djvu/400

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376
OUR ANGLO-INDIAN ARMY.

road, however, by which alone the rear could be gained, was declared impassable for guns; but this difficulty was overcome by expedients peculiarly Oriental. Six elephants became the bearers of as many pieces of cannon, while seven hundred Coolies were put in requisition to carry the necessary ammunition and equipments. In this manner an indescribably bad road was successfully traversed, the wild and rugged hills passed in safety, and a descent effected into the plain in the enemy's rear.

Here, however, the British troops were as badly off as ever, the enemy's rear being found as unassailable as his front; and numerous attempts to attack him with advantage were baffled, either by the difficulty of the ground or the vigilance and bravery of the foe. Disappointed in the immediate attainment of his object, Colonel Ochterlony still continued to pursue it with exemplary perseverance, though his operations were not distinguished by any of that dashing enterprise which had cost so dearly at Kalunga; for he seemed to have a juster opinion than any of his colleagues, or even of the Government itself, of the formidable character of the foe he had to contend with. At last, after a series of skilful manœuvres, Ummeer Sing was compelled to quit his position and move in a direction to cover his supplies, leaving small garrisons in Ramgurh and the other forts in that range.

The progress of the British arms in this quarter was now steady and satisfactory. On the 11th of February, 1815, the heights of Ramgurh were taken possession of without opposition: the surrender of the fort of Ramgurh followed. The garrison of Jhoo-Jooroo surrendered to a detachment of irregulars. Taragurh was evacuated by the enemy on the 11th of March; the fort of Chumbull subsequently surrendered, and Ramgurh was converted into a principal depôt.

The proceedings of General Wood's division of the invading army now require to be noticed. Its march, in the first instance, was considerably retarded by the want of means for transporting the stores and supplies; its