including irregulars, to 70,000 men of all arms. The Deccan force comprised two army-corps under Generals Sir Thomas Hislop and Sir John Malcolm; Colonel Adams led the regiments from Berar, while Generals Doveton and Smith took post in the rear, ready either to support the main body, or to suppress any commotion that might arise at Poonah or Nagpore. The army of reserve was assembled on the frontier of the ceded districts; and the Guzerat field-force, under General Sir William Keir, was stationed in advance of Baroda, ready to move into Malwa.
All these divisions formed a complete circle round the Pindarrie positions, closing in upon them as to a common centre, it being only by such a movement that they could be secured and finally crushed. There was, however, one circumstance attending this campaign which could not be regarded without some degree of alarm; namely, that it led our armies into the territories of princes who viewed with the most rancorous jealousy the height to which the British power had now attained; and who, seeing in its success the downfall of their own ambitious hopes, and even of their independence, anxiously watched the favourable moment for striking a blow. It was not possible to estimate the varying force of all our enemies; but it may be roughly stated that the Mahratta confederacy had 130,000 horse, 80,000 foot, and 580 guns, while the different fragments that remained of their Pindarrie allies would form a total of about 15,000. But it was not their number that was to be so much considered as the extensive field of war, the numerous strong fortresses in Central India, and the well-known Mahratta facilities for making forced marches, and lighting up the flames of war at many and distant points nearly at the same moment.
The matériel and military means we possessed in India at this period were, it is true, stupendous; but our Anglo-Indian Army had still much to learn, and it was still defective in several very essential departments.
