from the attack of an enemy whose artillery was but light. Two detached posts completed our position – one at the village of Puzendown, about a mile below the town, where the Pegu and Rangoon rivers meet; the other at Kemmendine, about three miles above the town: this second post being chiefly intended to protect our shipping against the descent of the enemy's fire-rafts.
On the morning of the 1st of July the enemy issued in dense masses from the jungle to the right and front of the great pagoda. Detaching to their left a column, which succeeded in setting fire to a part of the village of Puzendown, their main body came boldly up to within half a mile of Rangoon, and commenced a spirited attack upon part of our line. But two field-pieces served with grape and shrapnell soon checked their advance, and then a brilliant charge by the 43rd Madras Native Infantry put them all to flight. In a very few minutes not a man could be seen of the Burmese host except the killed; nor could anything be heard of them except a wild screaming which proceeded from the depths of the jungle.
The Burmese general who commanded in this exploit was immediately superseded, and the result seems to have induced his successor, Soomba Woonghie, to conclude that the military genius of the Burmese lay rather for the defensive; he therefore stockaded his army in the most difficult part of the forest, whence desultory attacks were made almost nightly upon some part of the British lines. The British commander, however, determined on affording him an opportunity for the display of his talents in a general action; and on the 8th of July two columns of attack were formed. One proceeded by land, under the command of Brigadier-General McBean; the other advanced by the river, and with it the Commander-in-Chief embarked.
The enemy's principal stockade was erected on a broad and projecting point of land, where the river divides into two branches. On the opposite bank of both branches stockades and other works were erected, enfilading the
