two hundred and thirty miles. Little occurred worthy of notice until the army arrived on the 20th of July at Nannee, situated ten miles from Ghuznee, where preparations were made for the attack of the latter place, which proved a fortress of considerable strength, and was the residence of one of Dost Mahommed's sons, who dwelt there in the capacity of governor.
The works of Ghuznee were found to be far stronger than Sir John Keane had been led to expect; and the four heavy guns of our battering-train had unfortunately been left behind at Candahar, in the belief that they would not be wanted. "The works," says Captain Thompson, "were evidently much stronger than we had been led to anticipate, and such as our army could not venture to attack in a regular manner with the means at our disposal. We had no battering-train; and to attack Ghuznee in form, a much larger train, would be required than the army ever possessed. The great height of the parapet above the plain (sixty or seventy feet), with the wet ditch, were insurmountable obstacles to an attack merely by mining or escalading."[1] The result of a réconnoissance was a report to the Commander-in-Chief that, if he decided on an immediate attack upon Ghuznee, the only feasible mode of proceedings and the only one which held out a prospect of success, was. to make a dash at the Cabul gateway, all the others having been built up, and blow the gate open by bags of powder. Sir John Keane resolved to adopt this method, and directed the ordnance department to make the necessary preparations.
The requisite orders for the storming of Ghuznee were circulated among the commanding officers on the evening of the 22nd of July, and so much of them communicated to the troops as was necessary to enable them to perform what was required. The various parts of the British force destined to take part in the attack were in position before daylight. The night was stormy, and
- ↑ Memoranda of the Engineers' Operations before Ghuznee in July, 1839.
