Page:Our Indian Army.djvu/553

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OUR ANGLO-INDIAN ARMY.
529

the enemy became greatly emboldened, and were joined by many who had been hitherto our friends; while the British troops were greatly disheartened, especially when they saw the Affghans crossing and recrossing the road between the Commissariat fort and the gate of the Shah Bagh, laden with the provisions on which depended their ability to make a protracted defence.[1]

To retrieve this disaster, Major Swayne was sent on the 5th to attack a fort which commanded the one lost, and some success was at first gained; but not being duly followed up, the detachment was recalled. On the 6th a stronger and more regular corps was employed, when the artillery having made a practicable breach, the place was carried by a storming-party of her Majesty's 44th, and the 5th and 37th Native Infantry. Ensign Raban, of the 44th, was shot through the heart in the act of waving the British flag on the summit of the breach.

For some days after this affair shot and shells were thrown from the Bala Hissar into the town, but with little effect beyond the alarm they excited amongst the inhabitants. Plans were also suggested for recapturing the Commissariat fort, and so much of the stores as yet remained in it; but they were suggested only, not acted upon.

On the 9th of November, the health of General Elphinstone was so much affected that Brigadier Shelton was desired to take the command; but he had scarcely done so, when a wide difference of opinion arose between him and Sir William Macnaghten, which very much retarded the public service; for while the Brigadier, who from the first had despaired of being able to hold out the winter at Cabul, advocated an immediate retreat to Jellalabad, the Envoy, on the contrary, conceived the army bound to maintain their position, for which their power, if vigorously exerted, appeared to him to be quite sufficient. Between their conflicting counsels, therefore, no decided course of action was adopted, and the very worst consequences were the result.

  1. Lieutenant Eyre's "Military Operations at Cabul."