Page:Our Indian Army.djvu/601

From Wikisource
Jump to navigation Jump to search
This page has been proofread, but needs to be validated.
OUR ANGLO-INDIAN ARMY.
577

made to remove the property within the residence; but the camp-followers became alarmed, and, after reaching the steamer with their first loads, could not be brought to return; while the fighting-men had employment more stirring and more important than looking after baggage. The greater portion of the property was therefore abandoned; and the British party evacuated their quarters in a body, covered by a few skirmishers. The movement was effected with perfect order; and the British Commissioner, with his brave escort, arrived in safety at the camp of Sir Charles Napier.

There was now no mode of deciding the existing differences but by the sword. Sir Charles Napier, accordingly, advanced to oppose the united armies of Upper and Lower Sinde, which were already in the field. On the 16th of February he reached Muttaree, where he learned that the Ameers had taken up a position at Meeanee, about twelve miles distant, with a force of 22,000 men and 15 guns, while the number then with him did not amount to 3,000. At eight o'clock on the following morning his advanced guard came in sight of their camp at Meeanee, within view of the towers of Hyderabad.

The position occupied by the Sindians had been chosen with great skill, and their immense superiority in point of numbers allowed them to turn it to the utmost advantage. Both flanks were protected by thick woods, which seemed calculated to baffle any attempt to turn them, while the whole length of their front was effectually secured by the dry bed and steep banks of the river Fulailee, one of the branches of the Indus. So soon as the British forces came within range of the enemy's guns, a battery of fifteen pieces of artillery opened upon them with deadly effect. The British had only twelve small field-pieces, which Sir Charles posted on his right, while some skirmishers and a body of native cavalry were ordered to advance and make the enemy show his force. The advance then took place from the right en échélon of battalions, the left wing being declined to escape the fire