Page:Parker v. Lewis, Hempst. 72 (Super. Ct. Ark. Terr. 1829).pdf/6

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TERRITORY OF ARKANSAS.
77

Parker v. Lewis et al.

sive and satisfactory. The evidence is clear as to seven bales of cotton, thirty-two head of hogs, thirteen head of cattle, one colt; and that the store goods sold under the execution for a little upwards of five hundred dollars; say that the goods were worth one thousand five hundred dollars, allowing two hundred per cent. more than they sold for at the sheriff's sale; putting the most extravagant estimate on the personal property sold under the execution, it could not have exceeded two thousand dollars in value. We have excluded the negroes from the estimate; it having been shown on the trial that the legal title to the negroes was in Lewis. He held a mortgage on them, and by virtue of it, had a right to their possession at any moment he chose to assert it. That the mortgage on this property vested the legal title in Lewis the mortgagee, and that he had a right to reduce the negroes to possession, whenever an opportunity presented, are propositions that cannot be controverted.[1] It is true, Lewis resorted to rather a singular mode to gain possession of the negroes. But the objection comes with ill grace from Parker. Lewis had his own negroes sold, allowed a credit for the amount for which they sold, and Parker complains of it! Parker’s equity of redemption could not be sold under execution, for the legal estate was in Lewis. 3 Atk. 739; 8 East, 467; 2 Bos. & Pul. New Rep. 461 b. But Parker has at this time a right to redeem these negroes, for his rights under the mortgage have not been impaired by the sale under the execution. It appears from this view of the case, that nearly six thousand dollars in vindictive damages were given by the jury. Did the law and the evidence authorize vindictive damages at all? We think not. But it has been said that juries in cases sounding in damages, have an unlimited and arbitrary control, and that they are in fact irresponsible, and that a court cannot grant a new trial. This position is certainly incorrect. It is not true when applied to actions for libels, slander, assault and battery, and other personal torts, for the books afford many in-


  1. The suit was subsequently adjusted between the parties, and on January 11, 1831, on the motion of Chester Ashley, Esq., attorney for the defendants, was dismissed, the defendant paying the costs.

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