Page:Paul Samuel Reinsch - Secret Diplomacy, How Far Can It Be Eliminated? - 1922.djvu/77

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many required a war because only thus could the feeling of unity among the German people, until then divided into numerous small states, be molded into political oneness. But in bringing on the Franco-Prussian war, no matter how in- evitable he might consider such a struggle, he was too confident of his ability to play the part of a Providence and to cut short the slow proc- esses of historic development. Therefore, though he attempted to work in the interest of outstand- ing national factors, his policy was not of a na- ture to develop that public confidence in the aims of his nation on which alone a statesman can per- manently build. His was the diplomacy of au- thority, often announcing its aims with great frankness, indeed, but always retaining the old method so that the public mind remained often in the dark. His politics directed German devel- opment into a dangerous course. He abhorred German disunion, but tried to cure it with means too forceful and artificial. The solutions brought about further problems. The taking of Alsace- Lorraine was the cause of future war. In 1871, Bismarck offered Mulhouse to Switzerland se- cretly, but the gift was declined. In the years after 1871, Bismarck always threatened Parlia-