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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011
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| 154. | The U S. does not want to be associated with a settlement which falls short of the seven-point memorandum on which Britain agreed and now appear to be less than firm. "If either or both the French and Communists are operating on the assumption we will adhere to any settlement they agree to, then we may be headed for serious trouble." Dulles 52 to Paris, 3, July 1954 | 603 |
| 155. | Dillon recommends that if the U.S. attempts to get the best possible settlement, we should (1) maintain a Geneva delegation, (2) have Dulles return to head the delegation, (3) offer French support to sell a settlement to Vietnam if it is satisfactory, and (4) pressure Britain to stick to the seven points of US-UK agreement. Paris 41 to Dulles, 4 July 1954 | 606 |
| 156. | The French welcome the US-UK 7-point agreement except that clarification was suggested on the conflict between provisions for elections and the position that no political provisions should risk loss of the area to communism . The French felt that the elections could "go wrong." Paris 50 to Dulles, 6 July 1954 | 608 |
| 157. | The French indicate they attach no great military importance to retention of Haiphong and that they were "avoiding contact" with the Vietnamese in order not to have to answer their questions. SECTO 560, 6 July 1954 | 609 |
| 158. | Mendes-France will announce to the National Assembly that if a cease-fire is not agreed to prior to 21 July, it will be necessary for the Assembly to approve the sending of conscripts to Indochina. Paris 66 to Dulles, 6 July 1954 | 612 |
| 159. | Dulles informs Eden that it is "better if neither Bedell nor I went back" to Geneva since the French will probably settle for worse than the 7-point agreement, hence it would be embarrrassing to all concerned. Dulles NIACT 101 to London, 7 July 1954 | 614 |
| 160. | The U.S. feels that elections mean eventual unification of Vietnam under Ho Chi Minh and therefore should be held "as long after a cease-fire agreement as possible and in conditions free from intimidation.…" Further, the U.S. believes no date should be set now and that no conditions be accepted which would affect international supervision of elections. The U.S. would not oppose a settlement based on the 7-points nor would we seek to upset a settlement by force. Dulles 77 to Paris, 7 July 1954 | 616 |
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