NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011
TOP SECRET
| Control: | 6854 |
| Rec'd: | June 14, 1954 |
| 7:26 p.m. |
| FROM: | Paris |
| TO: | Secretary of State |
| NO: | 4841, June 14, 5 p.m. |
SENT DEPARTMENT 4841; REPEATED INFORMATION GENEVA 393.
DEPARTMENT EYES ONLY SECRETARY
GENEVA EYES ONLY UNDER SECRETARY
1. In all probability one of first acts of any new French Government will be request precise statement immediate and future US intentions regarding military intervention Indochina.
2. During past week, I have gathered the very definite impression that because of (A) our reluctance to send ground forces to Indochina; ( B) deterioration of military and political situation in Indochina during last month; (C) extreme reluctance, if not refusal, of ANZUS partners to consider joining US in any military intervention in Delta area, the chances of US responding favorably to French request for military assistance even after they have met all conditions are approximately nil.
3. Hardening of Communist position in Geneva as indicated by Molotov and Chou En-lai last week would seem to indicate that Communists no longer fear possibility of US military intervention in Indochina provided there is no overt Chinese attack. If would seem, therefore, that Viet Minh and Chinese will not accept any armistice which does not clearly pave the way for Communist takeover in Indochina.
4. Lacking the possibility of US military support, it would seem to be only a question of time, weeks or a few months at very most, before French are forced to accept Viet Minh term. In the meantime, there is the constant risk of an all-out assault on the Delta which could lead to a serious French reverse, if not total annihilation of expeditionary corps in Tonkin.
I have continually pointed out that such a reverse might have a disastrous effect on French public opinion. Today I a more certain than ever that such would be the case. Rightly or
