Page:Pentagon-Papers-Part-V-B-3b.djvu/78

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

 

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9. In addition to the foregoing, it is considered that the transfer of a ROKA division to Indochina would be attended by the following advantages and disadvantages having military implications:

Advantages

a. It would augment the present "foreign forces" of 192,000 French metropolitan and colonial troops by about 15,000 men. This would enhance the capability of the French to implement the Navarre Plan for offensive operations designed eventually to achieve a military victory, and could furnish to the French Union forces the new impetus required to accomplish this objective;

b. It could create a situation that would make it more difficult for the French to withdraw from Indochina or to negotiate a settlement with the Viet Minh of a nature prejudicial to the future freedom of the Associated States. A rejection of the offer by the French would tend to place increased onus on them to bring the Indochinese conflict to a successful military conclusion with the forces now available or planned;

c. It would represent a concrete step in fostering unity of action by anti-Communist Asiatic forces in countering Communist aggression in Asia, with immense psychological gain to the Free World;

d. It would open the way for a well-trained, battle-experienced ROKA division, by exhibiting a high standard of performance in combat, to inspire and stimulate the Vietnamese forces to greater efforts;

e. If a ROKA division performed well in Indochina, it would serve as a demonstration of the effectiveness of United States training methods in Korea, and might speed the adoption of comparable training methods in Indochina;

Disadvantages

f. It would provide President Rhee with an opportunity to exploit the situation to his own ulterior purposes. It might be his hope that the transfer of a ROKA division to Indochina would lead to a renewal of hostilities in Korea;

g. The burden of moving and providing logistic support for the ROKA division would most certainly devolve, directly or indirectly, on the United States. This would impose additional responsibilities, commitments, and costs on the United States Government and on the United States military

 

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