Page:Pentagon-Papers-Part-V-B-3c.djvu/172

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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

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FROM PARIS, 2501, DECEMBER 19, 4PM SECTION ONE OF TWO

suggestions should be precise and energetic. There was no time left too allow for anything less. Mendes wished reaffirm his past agreement with Secretary's thesis that we must do our maximum to permit Diem government to succeed. Now he wished add that he was no longer sure that even maximum would help. He said we must now have alternate formula in mind. Without varying from our stated purpose of supporting Diem government as long as it exists we must now prepare in our minds for alternative.

Secretary replied that he recognized task in South Vietnam was difficult one. Difficult because it required that government be built of indigenous peoples with little or not experience. Moreover, they had to build in time of great stress following military defeat, temporary partition and while there was great influx of refugees from north. Secretary regarded basic factors as favorable. People were opposed to Communism and had great natural resources. They had exportable suprlus. They received greater aid from abroad than north. Beginning of joint Franco-U.S. task difficult, but situation was much improved now that there was full cooperation between French and American authorities. Problem must not be approached between French and American authorities. Problem must not be approached in spirt of defeatism, Only serious problem we have not yet solved is that of indigenous leadership. We cannot expect it to be solved ideally because there is no tradition among indigenous people for self-government. We must get along with something less good than best.

Secretary continued to say that he had no RPT no personal judgment of personalities involved, but our indications were that Diem was best man available in spite of failings. We visualized Cabinet with broad appeal and authority. This vision has not RPT not been realized. Diem appears to be man constitutionally incapable of making decisions. US not RPT not committed to Diem in any irrevocable sense. We have accepted him because we knew of no one better. Developments have confirmed our fears as to his limitations but no substitute for him has yet been proposed. Those suggested in past varied from month to month. Now it is claimed that only Bao Dai can save situation. If that is case, then we must indeed be desperate. Secretary's view we should continue back Diem but exert more pressure on

him to
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