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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

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FROM PARIS, 2601 DECEMBER 19, 4PM
SECTION TWO OF TWO

on Diem to get things done. Before considering alternate solutions. Radford will be in Saigon Dec 22 to report result our conversations to Collins. Secretary agreed we must explore all possibilities but warned that mere fact we were doing so was sufficient to undermine present Govt. He asked Mendes not to think we had obstinately closed our minds to possible alternate solution. We had not RPT not but our investigation of alternate must be done on careful basis and we must for present support Diem.

Mendes agreed. To summarize he had three main points: first, to support Diem; second, to study alternatives. Collins and Ely should be instructed to explore further possibilities including Bao Dai with greatest discretion. Secretary then returned to viceroy question asking if proposed man would be independent or dependent on Bao Dai. Mendes stated he would be independent but would derive legality from Bao Dai. Question would be studied further and French proposal passed on to Collins and Ely for study.

Mendes' third point was that Ely and Collins should be requested investigate matter of timing. How much further delay can be tolerated Mendes asked? We must set deadline. The generals must come to conclusion on two and three and make precise recommendations to us so that we can take necessary decisions.

Secretary agreed but stated that fourth point must be added. It is that if US should decide that there is no RPT no good alternative to Diem we will have to consider how much more investment we will be prepared to make in Indochina. Our policy would have to be reappraised. Congressional committees, particularly the two foreign affairs committees, led by Mansfield and Richards, were intensely interested in problem and would have to be consulted. They both had strong feelings. Mansfield believes in Diem. Secretary was not RPT not fully cognizant with Richards' opinions but thought he did too. Secretary believed that even slight chance of success in Vietnam was worth considerable investment. US had also to think of what happened in adjacent countries -- in Cambodia, Laos, Thailand and Malaya. US situation was different from that

of French.

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