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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

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-2- 4448, APRIL 9, 10 P.M. (SECTION 4 OF 5) FROM SAIGON

to defect. Such incidents would have very limited effect on bulk of army. It should be said here that under no circumstances should General Minh be allowed return to Viet Nam now. He retains considerable influence in army and could become once again major disruptive influence.

4. Compilation of assets of strength Diem may have is difficult to make. With respect to political following in center Viet Nam. This has been falling off partly as result of political activities of Diem's brother Ngo Dinh Can, and opposition has taken form for example of recent incidents at Ba Lang. There is no proper grass roots support of any leader in Viet Nam, leaving aside Ho Chi Minh. Diem's virtues as anti-French leader have been tarnished by his dependence on his brothers which has led to quite general feeling that a Ngo family dictatorship is in effect being established. Few nationalists outside his family and immediate entourage would lift a finger in Diem's defense. How great his following is in Catholic community is hard to say. Diem himself claims his support in center, for example, comes largely from non-Catholics. In any event Catholic community is not politically organized and represents less than 10 percent of population. Certainly many refugees from north were attracted by fact Catholic heads government of south, but political and physical strength of refugees is only a potential for exploitation at a later date. In national army, scarcely any leaders are entirely pro-Diem, even Chief of Staff Ty; some are hostile, and the majority are probably no more than luke-warm. I believe there is no reason to anticipate serious adverse reaction in army at large. If Diem is removed through orderly processes.

5. Viet Minh reaction to Diem's removal would undoubtedly be to effect that free world had suffered damaging setback. Apart from stepped-up propaganda campaign and public gloating over defeat of an enemy, I do not believe Viet Minh reaction would be dangerous. In other words, I do not anticipate Viet Minh would attempt take military advantage of Diem's removal. However, Viet Minh, playing many angles as usual, might attempt build up anti-French and anti-U.S. sentiment, charging overthrow of nationalist government to French and U.S. "imperialists."

KIDDER
904


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