Page:Pentagon-Papers-Part-V-B-3c.djvu/318

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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011
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of the French Expeditionary Corps is ultimately to be desired, it is considered that a precipitate withdrawal now would be likely to result in an increasingly unstable and precarious situation. This situation would undoubtedly be exploited to Communist advantage, with the probable eventuality that South Vietnam would be lost to communism.

5. In the face of the strong anti-French sentiment which has developed in Vietnam, there now seems little prospect that France alone can provide either the leadership or the resources required to establish a stable Vietnamese government. Without United States moral and materiel support it cannot be expected that the VNA would develop into a cohesive military force or maintain even its present limited effectiveness. Without effective indigenous forces and without a Vietnam government which can command the loyalty and support of its people, the French Expeditionary Corps (FEC), judged by past performances, would be incapable of preserving the security and integrity of Vietnam. It can therefore be expected that, following the pattern which led to the loss in the North, South Vietnam would, in due course, fall to the Communists.

6. For the foregoing reasons, the Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that neither of the alternatives suggested represent acceptable solutions to the problem of Vietnam at this time. They feel it to be in the best interest of France as well as of the United States that every reasonable effort be exerted to preserve South Vietnam from communism. It is their opinion that the present situation, involving armed resistance against the established governmental authority and the dangers inherent in the role assumed by the Revolutionary Committee, requires the utmost in cooperation and energetic action by the Vietnamese, United States, and French Governments toward the restoration of internal order and governmental control in Vietnam. It is considered that this should constitute the immediate joint objective. The Join Chiefs of Staff recommend that Mr. Dulles be advised that from the military point of view:

a. The government of Prime Minister Ngo Dinh Diem shows the greatest promise of achieving the internal stability essential for the future security of Vietnam.
b. The United States could not guarantee the security of the French nationals should the French Expeditionary Corps be withdrawn.
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