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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

TOP SECRET


9 May 1955


MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: Possible French Withdrawal from Vietnam


M. Faure's proposal to Mr. Dulles that the French withdraw their forces from Vietnam may, is properly played, permit a real reversal of the trend toward Communism in Southeast Asia.

If the U. S. can and will make a deal with Die,, in which he pledges to protect French civilians remaining after French troops leave, in return for our assurances of increased aid and the rapid end effective training of his army, we should be happy to see the French leave.

A move of this sort would clearly disengage us from the taint of Colonialism derived from our support of the French and Bao Dai which has plagued us throughout Asia. It would put us clearly in our traditional role of supporting the "independence and legitimate national aspirations" of peoples. The repercussions or this throughout Asia and the Moslem world will be great and beneficial. A clear stand against French colonialism may greatly free our hands at some later date with regard to French North Africa where an explosion like Indo China seems inevitable.

French withdrawal will, also effectively stop the potential double-dealing we have suspected of the Saintenay mission in Viet Minh, where it appears the French have been insuring against the loss of Free Vietnam to the Viet Minh by compromising with the Communists so as to retain commercial and other advantages after a takeover. At one time it as rumored the French might even accept a Communist Indo China in the French Union.

A tacit assumption by the U. S. of the support of Free Viet Nam might, of course, eventually involve us in a substantial commitment. However, this is by no means certain, and there is a real likelihood training, technical assistance and moderate aid will be all that is required. We should not forget that we are already committed under SEATO to defend Viet Nan against overt attack. The new situation would permit, in psychological terns, the all-out use of "Militant Liberty" to help build Pree Viet Nam resolve.

As a final point to remember, the French declared at Geneva that they would withadraw their forces at any time if requested by the Free Viet Nam Government.


C, H. BONESTEEL, III
Brigadier General, United States Army
Defense Member, NSC Planning Board

975


TOP SECRET