Page:Pentagon-Papers-Part-V-B-3c.djvu/56

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

 

TOP SECRET

SENSITIVE

 

'14. Reduce the relative power of Communist China in Asia even at the risk of, but without deliberately provoking, war:

'a. (1) React with force, if necessary and advantageous, to expansion and subversion recognizable as such, supported and supplied by Communist China.

⁠'(2) React. with immediate, positive, armed force against any belligerent move by Communist China.

'b. Increase efforts to develop the political, economic and military strength of non-Communist Asian countries, including the progressive development of the military strength of Japan, to the point where she can provide for her own national defense and, in time, contribute to the collective defense of the Far East.

'c, d, and e. Same as 13 c, d, and e.'

⁠REASONS: (1) Alternatives A and B would provide that the United States resort to armed action only in the event that Communist China itself committed armed aggression. Such a policy would be inadequate to cope with indirect aggression which experience indicates will be the most probable form of Chinese Communist aggression in the general area of Southeast Asia in the near future. It should be the objective of United States policy to block the further expansion of Communist China regardless 9f the methods by which such expansion is attempted.

(2) The proposed policy contained in Alternative D is considered to be extreme. It could hardly be expected that such a policy would receive the support of our major Allies. If adopted, it would require that the United States, in common prudence, now embark upon a major expansion of military forces, and take such other steps as are necessary to place the United States in a position to conduct large-scale military actions in the Far East. In short, the proposed policy is considered to be provocative and one which inherently would greatly increase the risk of general war.

(3) The objective set forth in Alternative C, as amended above, is consistent with previously expressed views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. It states a definite goal and provides for a positive approach to the problem of reducing

 

TOP SECRET

SENSITIVE