Page:Pentagon-Papers-Part-V-B-3d.djvu/11

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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011


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300. The U.S. assesses the possible coup groups in Saigon (e.g. peasants, communists, labor, students, Catholic refugees, sects, police and Army) and concludes that long term effects of any demonstration depends on the attitude of the Army. Saigon 538 to State, 5 September 1960 1302
301. Lansdale offers several proposals to meet the threat to security posed by the Viet Cong in Vietnam. Specifically, he recommends shifting the MAAG function emphasis to assistance on tactical operations, increasing the MAAG staff, priority be given to furnishing selective equipment, more emphasis on counter-guerrilla intelligence training, and certain actions on activities of the Civil Guard, civic action, and MAP requiring interagency coordination. Lansdale Memorandum for ISA, 13 September 1960 1307
302. The Diem regime is confronted by two separate, but related dangers -- a non-communistic coup attempt in Saigon and gradual Viet Cong extension of control in the countryside. U.S. objectives rest on a strongly anti-communist but popularly supported government; continued failures by Diem is cause to seek alternative leaders. Saigon 624 to State, 16 September 1960 1311
303. The U.S. suggests numerous political actions to President Diem, among them are Cabinet changes, more responsibility for Cabinet members, alteration of the Can Lao Party from a secret organization to a normal political party, investigation of Government departments by the National Assembly, freer press functions, and measures to enhance the Government's support in rural areas. In addition, it is suggested that Ngo Dinh Nhu, the President's brother, be given an ambassadorial post outside the country. Saigon 157 to State, 15 October 1960 1317
304. Diem's responses to the suggestions for political action and removal of Nhu outwardly show no resentment. Saigon 802 to State, 15 October 1960 1323
305. The U.S. urges preparation of an over-all plan, acceptable to GVN, for integration and centralized direction of maximum resources to combat the insurgency. DOD-State 653 to Saigon, 19 October 1960 1325
306. U.S. urges Diem and the coup leaders to reach a quick agreement and avoid further bloodshed. Herter 775 to Saigon, 11 November 1960 1327
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