Page:Pentagon-Papers-Part-V-B-3d.djvu/178

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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

11. The problems associated with United States non-recognition of the government of Communist China and its exclusion from the United Nations are ever preset, and the evolution of the situation may not meet the convenience of the United States. Time is on the side of the Chinese Communists and unless the United States takes some positive action to weaken or disrupt their control the regime will further consolidate its position. If they continue to gain strength—internally and their respectability grows among other nations, it may be expected that the United States will eventually be faced with a very difficult reassessment of its policy toward Communist China in an unfriendly climate of world opinion.

12. U.S. courses of action are sometimes developed around the person of the head of a government rather than the government itself. This is especially true where the United States has sponsored President Chiang Kai-shek of the GRC, President Syngman Rhee of the ROK and President Ngo Dinh Diem of South Vietnam. In the case of these three nations, the U.S. appears to view the heads of government as being synonymous with the government itself. These men have come to power as a result of armed conflict, are firmly entrenched, and, in practice, their systems do not allow a change of chief executives through peaceful constitutional processes. The United States thus finds itself without room to maneuver politically in dealing with these countries, since negotiations are with the Chief Executives whose actions may or may not be influenced by public opinion. The United States is so closely identified with and committed to Presidents Chiang and Rhee, in particular that the

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