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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011
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| 1959 | Page | |
| 283. | Draft editorial amendments of NSC 5429/5 are forwarded to the National Security Council for consideration. Substantive change in U.S. policy is not intended but elimination of ambiguity in use of the term "hot pursuit" where doctrinal meaning in international law conflicts with use in NSC 5429/5. JCS study on "hot pursuit," 23 October 1958, is included. Memorandum for the NSC, 5 January 1959 | 1148 |
| 284. | Vietnam displays serious concern about developments in Laos, Cambodia's recognition of Communist China, and the U.S. position in the Taiwan straits. Major problems facing the U.S. are Diem's internal political position, internal security, and economic development. CIA analysis and financial summaries of assistance programs to Southeast Asia are included. OCB Report on Southeast Asia, 7 January 1959 | 1156 |
| 285. | Defense (TSA) suggests that it is advisable to withhold the replacement of F-BF aircraft in VNAF with AD-4 type aircraft. Defense Memorandum for JCS, 22 January 1959 | 1183 |
| 286. | The JCS recommends improvement of Tan Son Nhut Airfield and Tourane Airfield be improved for jet aircraft "under the guise of commercial aviation." JCS Memorandum for Secretary of Defense, 19 March 1959 | 1184 |
| 287. | Responsibilities within the Defense Department are assigned for the twenty courses of action in the OCB "Operation Plan for Vietnam." Among the courses of action are: popularize the image of Vietnam among neutralists, probe weaknesses of the Viet Cong, develop maximum combat capabilities of RVNAF, and encourage GVN to maintain an effective Self-Defense Corps. ISA Memorandum for JCS, 20 May 1959 | 1185 |
| 288. | An intelligence analysis of the situation in Vietnam and estimates of possible developments conclude that (1) the prospect of reunification of DRV and GVH is remote, (2) Diem will be President for many years by repressing opposition via the Can Lao political apparatus, (3) internal security forces will not be able to defeat DRV supported guerrilla and subversive forces, (4) GVN will continue to rely heavily on U.S. aid, (5) and DRV is in full control of North Vietnam and likely to continue harassment of GVN and Laos. NIE 63-59, 26 May 1959 | 1190 |
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