Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011
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b. The Forthcoming Fourteen-Power Conference:
The very fact that the Fourteen Powers are meeting under essentially the same, ground rules as the 1954 Geneva agreements, including the concept of an ICC mechanism in Laos, Vietnam and Cambodia, could have a politically inhibiting effect on any significant measures which the U.S. might undertake to prevent a Communist take-over in South Vietnam.
c. SEATO Responsibilities under the Manila Pact:
Responsibility for the defense of South Vietnam, both against external aggression and internal subversion, was assumed by the SEATO powers under the protocol to the Manila Pact. The unanimity principle governing SEATO action has prevented that organization from taking any measures to resist Communist advances to date. Yet the very existence of SEATO makes it politically desirable that any military operations in Southeast Asia be conducted under its aegis. This in turn inhibits, to a certain degree, U.S. unilateral military actions.
d. The Morale Problem within South Vietnam:
The failure of SEATO to take any action to halt the Communist actions in Laos has in large measure impaired the credibility of that organization insofar as providing collective assistance in the defense of any nation in the area. Similarly, the U.S. reluctance to play a more active leadership role in SEATO has also contributed to a general lowering of morale among the G.V.N. governmental officials and intelligentsia. Meanwhile the Communist terrorist campaign has been stepped up, thereby
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