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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011
TOP SECRET – Sensitive
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| 49. | The U.S. is prepared to join the VN Government in a sharply increased joint effort to avoid a further deterioration in the situation in SVN. This joint effort is contingent upon initiation of certain actions on the part of the GVN and consists of increased economic and military support by the U.S., based on recommendations of the Taylor Report, NSAM 111, 22 November 1961 | 419 | |
| 50. | Bundy comments on the command arrangements for VN and recommends that General McGarr be elevated to the new position or that a replacement be found. He also recommends sending Lansdale back as Diem has requested. Bundy Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense, 25 November 1961 | 422 | |
| 51. | General Taylor relates a list of questions proposed by President Kennedy to be used at a meeting of his key advisors. Among the questions are: (1) what is the situation with regard to Diem as reported by Ambassador Nolting; (2) can we delay longer in obtaining an answer from Diem; (3) what are the views of the JCS on the military organization required to support the new program; (4) what is our plan for flood relief; (5) who should the President regard as personally responsible for the effectiveness of the Washington end of this operation? General Taylor Memorandum for Secretary McNamara, 27 November 1961 | 423 | |
| 52. | The President approves U.S. participation in a selective and carefully controlled joint program of defoliant operations in VN starting with the clearance of key routes and proceeding thereafter to food denial. NSAM 115, 30 November 1961 | 425 | |
| 53. | McNamara confirms to Rusk the command arrangements under which the senior U.S. military commander in Vietnam will have the title "Commander, U.S. Military Assistance Forces - Vietnam" and will have equivalent rank to the Ambassador, reporting through CINCPAC to the JCS. Secretary of Defense Memorandum for the Secretary of State, 18 December 1961 | 426 | |
| 54. | Diem is apprehensive about giving control authority to Big Minh as military field commander because of his fear of a coup. While U.S. policy is to support Diem and he has been so informed by the President, we must find a way to reassure him about a coup. "It is the basis for his real reluctance to do what the Americans want him to do and this basic point needs resolving…what realistic assurances can we give Diem that the action he fears won't take place?" Lansdale Memorandum for the CJCS, 27 December 1961 | 427 |
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TOP SECRET – Sensitive
