Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011
SECRET
of the Vietnamese population and to use the organization to increase the awareness of people of the true nature of Viet Nam's fight for survival against Communist insurgency and terrorist techniques.
6. Financial Implications
The joint VN-US group does not consider itself competent to make specific recommendations as to desired force levels for the defense of Viet Nam. They have, however, after consultation with their respective military authorities, adopted for economic planning purposes certain estimated strength figures for the GVN armed forces under two alternative assumptions. Alternative A assumes that the Communist-led insurgency effort remains at approximately its present level of intensity and that the Government of Laos maintains sufficient independence from the Communist Bloc to deny authority for the transit of DVN or Communist Chinese troops across its borders. Alternative B assumes that the Viet Cong are able to significantly increase their insurgency campaign within Viet Nam and that the situation in Laos continues to deteriorate to the point where the Communists gain de facto control of that country.
Under these alternative assumptions, the following force levels and costs have been assumed in the preparation of this report and its recommendations:
| FORCE LEVELS | |||||
| 1961 | 1962 | 1963 | 1964 | 1965 | |
| Regular Forces | |||||
| (1) Alternative A | 170,000 | 200,000 | 200,00 | 200,000 | 200,000 |
| (2) Alternative B | 170,00 | 200,000 | 230,000 | 260,000 | 278,00[1] |
| Civil Guard | 67,500 | 70,000 | 70,000 | 70,000 | 70,000 |
| Local Defense Forces | 58,000 | 60,000 | 60,000 | 60,000 | 60,000 |
| Youth Corps | - | 108,000 | 108,000 | 108,000 | 108,000 |
- ↑ To be reached during the first months of 1965
