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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011
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the military and paramilitary effort to defeat the VC." While the results from programs developed after Taylor's Mission in 1961 were heartening, the serious events in the South since May 1963 have prompted the President to ask McNamara to make a fresh, first-hand appraisal of the situation. "In my judgement the question of the progress of the contest in SVN is of the first importance…" President Kennedy Memorandum for Secretary of Defense, 21 September 1963 |
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| 82. | Pending McNamara's visit and the subsequent review of policy, Lodge is given the following interim guidance: "(1) The United States intends to continue its efforts to assist the Vietnamese people in their struggle against the Viet Congo (2) Recent events have put in question the possibility of success in these efforts unless there can be important improvements in the government of South Vietnam. (3) It is the policy of the United States to bring about such improvement." State Department Message 458, Eyes Only for Lodge from Ball, 22 September 1963 | 553 |
| 83. | The McNamara-Taylor Mission Report concludes that the military campaign has made great progress, and, while the political crisis in Saigon is serious, "there is no solid evidence of the possibility of a successful coup…" The Report recommends against promoting a coup and, although it is not clear that U.S. pressure, will move Diem to the moderations and reforms we desire, nevertheless, as the only course of action with any prospect of producing results, the report recommends the application of selective economic sanctions, including a suspension of funds for the commodity import program. The Mission further recommends a shift of military emphasis to the Delta and a consolidation of the Strategic Hamlet Program. In addition, it is recommended that a training program be established for RVNAF such that the bulk of U.S. personnel may be withdrawn by the end of 1965. In conjunction with this program, the U.S. should announce plans to withdraw 1,000 U.S. military personnel by the end of 1963 | 554 |
| 84. | Lodge is advised that as a result of the policy review just completed, the "President today approved recommendation that no initiative should now be taken to give any active covert encouragement to a coup." Efforts to build and maintain contacts with "alternative leadership" is authorized, however. CAP Message 63560, to Lodge via CAS channel, 5 October 1963 | 574 |
| 85. | Contact has been renewed by the generals with a CAS agent who has been apprised of the reactivation of plotting. In the |
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