Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011
SECRET
Another element of RVNAF which has a greater capability for effective operations against the Viet Cong than at present is the River Forces of the VNN. Two general problems areas are currently preventing more effective employment.
The first is the problem of joint planning. The operational commander of the River Force is Commanding General, III Corps. As an Army Commander, he cannot be expected to know the many details of how best to employ the potential combat and support capabilities of these forces. I feel the solution lies in the establishment of a joint planning section with Naval representation on the Corps staff. Given proper technical advice, the Corps Commander could then realize much more effectiveness from the River Forces.
The second problem area is support for the River Forces, to include additional draft, better priority for maintenance, increased command recognition and assistance wih some acute personnel problems to include officer shortages and an equitable promotion policy within the VNN. Military missions should also be coordinated with civilian requirements for these craft.
In addition, as indicated in the Vinh Binh operation, better coordination with respect to the Sea Forces in Joint Operations appears necessary. This coordination should be accomplished at Joint General Staff level. Although some preplanning was accomplished at Joint Staff level, difficulty was experienced in coordination with the ground operation.
Another important progressive step was the establishment of logistic commands, one in each of the three Corps areas. This is resulting in the coordination of the six technical services in the field and is producing materially improved logistic support for the combat forces assigned to the Army Corps. Also, I am pleased to note that the RVNAF Deputy for Logistics, General To, has been given a degree of increased coordinating authority. However, there still remain may complicated delaying procedures which impair the effectiveness of logistic support to combat units. It appears particularly desirable that some of the ABA fiscal functions be decentralized to permit prompter response to the needs of combat units.
Another matter which I consider of sufficient importance to bring to your personal attention is the immediate requirement for additional civilian personnel in the technical service depots and other logistic installations.
SECRET
