Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011
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COMMAND AND CONTROL:
There appears to be too much delegation of responsibility and too little centralized control of tactical operations. Of course, decentralization in tactical operations in sound practice, if sufficient centralized control is maintained to ensure active supervision of higher commanders. Such is not always the case, however, because of a somewhat natural tendency for higher commanders. Such is not always the case, however, because of a somewhat natural tendency for higher commanders to say fixed in offices and CP's instead of getting out with subordinates to whom control has been delegated, to inspect, supervise, and give guidance needed to take advantage of the developing tactical situation. In this regard, an essential adjunct to strengthening the chain of command is the establishment in the RVNAF of an effective inspection system.
INADEQUATE INTELLIGENCE AND RECONNAISSANCE
Large forces, up to battalion size, are at times committed without sufficient knowledge of enemy locations. Consequently, these operations often produce negative results and are wasteful of time, energy and resources. Equally important, as they are non-productive, they are harmful to the morale and esprit of the officers and men. Better intelligence coordination between civil and military intelligence agencies are indicated
INCOMPLETE PLANNING:
In many ARVN operations, the planning emphasis appears to primarily on a scheme of maneuver, with inadequate attention to such other important aspects as sound coordination, teamwork, task organization, fire support, air support, communications, supply and resupply, and administration. Each phase must be thought through and planned for in detail, from the initial reconnaissance to locate the enemy, to his final destruction. Appropriate planning, units and resources must be allocated to each of these phases if we are to be successful.
USE OF PROVISIONAL TASK FORCES:
Operations are too often conducted by makeshift, "provisoire," task forces under a provisional commander, when there are available regular units of appropriate size and composition. A commander who finds an immediate opportunity to gain a victory, properly commits everything at his disposal into battle - often with provisional organizations. This, however, should be the exception, not the rule. The reason for units such as
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