Page:Pentagon-Papers-Part-V-B-4-Book-I.djvu/297

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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011


SECRET/NOFORN

11.

and the series of attacks against army and other government outposts in the Kontum-Pleiku area in October 1960. Since the beginning of this year, Communist guerrillas have generally operated in smaller bands, making it more difficult for government forces to find and engage them. However, a series of attacks principally against security forces this month have reportedly involved about 1,000 Communist personnel.

The capture of weapons and equipment has significantly improved Communist armed capability. Communist bands appear to be adequately armed with a variety of small weapons, frequently utilize light machine-guns and mortars and occasionally rocket launchers and recoilless rifles, and are becoming increasingly adept in the manufacture and use of land mines and other explosives. During some engagements, Communist guerrillas have been reported wearing South Vietnamese military uniforms, complete with steel helmets, utilizing night flares, land vehicles, and motor-boats, and being aided by radio communications.

The casualties inflicted by Communist terrorists and guerrillas have been heavy. According to incomplete official Vietnamese statistics, Communist terrorists assassinated about 2,000 local officials and civilians and kidnapped almost another 1,800 from January 1960 through June 1961, while Communist guerrillas killed about 2,700 military and security personnel during armed engagements from May 1960 through June 1961. In comparison, the government claims that about 19,000-20,000 Communists have been killed or captured during 1960 and the first half of this year, but this estimate appears exaggerated. In any event, the casualties inflicted by the Communists have been sufficient to aggravate the existing shortage of local government officials, weaken morale particularly among the local bureaucracy and the security services, and foment peasant discontent.

The effects of the Communist guerrilla-terrorist campaign in the countryside has been severe in other respects. Government operations in many areas have been constantly harassed and in some instances have been indefinitely suspended. For example, approximately 200 elementary schools in the south and southwest, affecting about 25,000 students and 800 teachers had closed down last year, and it is now believed that the number of schools inoperative because of the insurgency is about 300. Certain land development operations in the central provinces have been reduced by almost fifty percent, and Communist attempts to disrupt the economy have a shortage in the amount of rice available for export and have contributed to a rise in rice prices. Sabotage has increased substantially; by the first quarter of 1961, for example, about 250 bridges had been partially or totally destroyed by the Communists. Finally, an increasing number of inland waterways in the Mekong delta area, particularly minor canals leading to major waterways, have come under Communist control.

SECRET/NOFORN

268