Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011
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20.
The four opposition candidates (there were two opposition tickets, with two candidates on each ticket) would have had little chance of wining even if the elections had been completely free. They had no notable popular appeal of their own in or outside official circles and were not among the most vocal, articulate, or well-known critics of the government. A number of the latter were probably fearful of running or are still under arrest as a result of their alleged involvement in the 1960 abortive coup. Even in the Saigon area, where the opposition candidates concentrated their efforts and where they expected to do well, the Diem-Tho ticket got more than 70% the vote cast.
The following month Diem reorganized his cabinet, ostensibly to increase efficiency and liberalize the regime. The reorganization created three new departments with "coordinating" but still vague responsibilities over all other departments, established another new department for agriculture by merging the functions of two former departments as well as other executive agencies concerned with agrarian affairs, and placed under the existing departments a number, of the functions formerly within the Office of the President. While the new cabinet members for the most part seem technically more competent than their predecessors, their (illegible text) effectiveness will depend largely on the authority delegated to them by Diem — something which Diem has been reluctant to do and which has generated discontent within his official family.
E. Political Reprieve for Diem
Recent developments appear to have given President Diem something of a political reprieve. Diem's outstanding success at the polls last April, however questionable, probably deflated some of his critics, while the modest political reforms implemented to date may have given others some hope of further liberalization of the regime, However, what lessening of the sense of urgency over the crisis in South Vietnam has taken place, and there almost certainly has been some, can be attributed principally to strong US public manifistations of support for the Diem government including Vice President Johnson's visit, and to the substantial increase in US aid to help South Vietnam defeat the Communist insurgents. Moreover, the reorganizations within the military establishment and the degree of tactical planning permitted the military leadership appear to have alleviated dissatisfaction somewhat within tho upper echelon of the armed forces, while the recent large offensive operations against the Communists have presumably improved morale among the middle and lower echelons.
At best, however, the political situation remains highly fluid and, as yet, there has been no conclusive reversal of deteriorating trends. Although reports of coup-plotting and of dissatisfaction with Diem's leadership have decreased in recent months, their persistence is
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