Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011
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29.
effort. The possibility of Communist attempts to assassinate Diem would increase, and Americans would probably be singled out as special targets for terrorist attacks.
In the face of a Communist offensive of such proportions, South Vietnam would be required to make a maximum military effort in order to survive. There would be no immediate collapse. In the long run, however, the maintenance of South Vietnam's independence would rest principally on the nature and amount of US support and on a maximum effort by the South Vietnamese government to develop the political, psychological, and economic programs required to gain and retain popular support.
B. Domestic Political
The stability of the government during the next year or so will depend principally on Diem's handling of the internal security situation. If Diem can demonstrate a continuing improvement in security conditions, he should be able to strengthen his position, alleyiate concern and boost morale within his bureaucracy and military establishment, and lessen the urgency with which many of their members view the current situation. However, if the fight against the Communists goes poorly or the South Vietnamese Army suffers heavy casualties, the chances of a coup would substantially increase. However, the possibility of a coup attempt at any tine cannot be discounted. The odds favor a coup if security declines appreciably further, particularly if accompanied by what amounts to a Communist takeover of Laos.
The Communists would like to initiate and control a coup against Diem, and their armed and subversive operations, including "united front" propaganda among disaffected groups in South Vietnam, are directed toward this purpose. It is more likely, however, that any coup attempt which occurs during the next year or so would be non-Communist in leadership, involving army elements and civilian officials and perhaps some disgruntled oppositionists outside the government. In any event, the participating elements probably would be broader than those involved in the 1960 attempt, would have greater popular support particularly among the youth and labor groups, and could, be expected to be better prepared to execute their plan quickly and successfully. Moreover, while the role of the military leadership is by no means certain, a major split among the generals does not appear likely. Most of them probably would elect to remain uncommitted at the outset of the coup, as they apparently did in November 1960, adding their tacit or active support to whatever side appeared to have the best chance of winning. Under these circumstances, a military coup attempt would have better than a even chance of succeeding.
Diem's removal -- whether by a military coup, assassination, or death from accidental or natural causes -- would considerably strengthen the power of the military. The odds appear about even between a government
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