Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011
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COMMUNIST REACTION
Bloc overt aggression to counter the movement of SEATO forces into South Vietnam is considered unlikely. The most probable course of action by the Communists would be continued use of insurgents and infiltration. However, if the Bloc did decide to act overtly to counter the introduction of SEATO forces into the area, this action would probably follow, in general, the pattern set forth below:
GROUND ACTIONS
a. Basically an infantry invasion of South Vietnam and Laos and deployed in strength and direction as follows:
(1) Five divisions on the North/South Vietnam border to Saigon along the coastal route via Dong Ha - Tourane - Binh Dinh.
(2) One division (light) to Vientiane via Xieng - Khouang - Paksane.
(3) One division (light) to Thakhek and Savannekhet via Mugia Pass and Keo Neua Pass.
(4) A follow-up force of up to six divisions moving as follows:
(a) Two divisions to Saigon or Bangkok via Lao Bao Pass - down the lower Mekong Valley along Route 13 to Saigon or across the Mekong River to Bangkok.
(b) Two divisions to Bangkok via Routes 7, 8 and 13 through Laos into Thailand and on to Bangkok.
(c) Two divisions to be held in reserve along the North/South Vietnam border to be available to put additional momentum along the coastal route, or to effect a subsidiary effort in the Kontum-Pleiku Plateau.
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