Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
Washington, D. C.
10 October 1961
International Security Affairs
Refer to: 1 19126/61
MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY
SUBJECT: Viet-Nam
Even if the decision at tomorrow's meeting it only prelininary--to explore with Diem and the British, Australians, and New Zealanders would be my guess - - it is clearly of the greatest possible importance. Above all, action must proceed fast.
For what one man's feel is worth, mine -- based on very close touch with Indochina in the 1954 war and civil war afterwards till Diem took hold -- is that is is really now or never if we are to arrest the gains being made by the Viet Cong. Walt Rostow made the point yesterday that the Viet Cong are about to move, by every indication, from the small unit basis to a moderate battalion-size basis. Intelligence also suggests that they may try to set up a "provisional government" like Xieng Khuang (though less legitimate appearing) in the very Kontum area into which the present initial plan would move SEATO forces. If the Viet Cong movement "blooms " in this way, it will almost certainly attract all the back-the-winner sentiment that understandably prevails in such cases and that beat the French in early 1954 and came within an ace of beating Diem in early 1955.
An early and hard- hitting operation has a good chance (70% would be my guess) of arresting things and giving Diem a chance to do better and clean up. Even if we follow up hard, on the lines the JCS are working out after yesterday's meeting, however, the chances are not much better that we will in fact be able to clean up the situation. It all depends on Diem's effectiveness, which is very problematical. The 30% chance is that we would wind up like the French in 1954; white men can't win this kind of fight.
On a 70-30 basis, I would myself favor going in. But if we let, say, a month go by before ve move, the odds will slide (both short-term shock effect and long-term chance) down to 60-40, 50-50, and so on. Leos under a Souvanna Phouma deal is more likely than not to go sour, and will more and more make things difficult in South Viet-Nam, which again underscores the element of time.
William P. Bundy
Acting
Cy furnished:
Deputy Secretary
