Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011
TOP SECRET
Even if there were a 170,000 troop "credit" which we could legally draw upon, I doubt that the actions proposed in Saigon's telegram 537 are compatible with the further limitations contained in Article 16. For example, no unit introduced could be larger than a battalion, and rotation would have to be (1) on a man-for-man basis, (2) notified to the ICC two days in-advance, (3) carried on through certain listed entry points, and (4) supervised and inspected by the ICC.
The provisions of Article 17 might prove even more burdensome. Entry of military equipment must take place at listed entry points under the supervision of the ICC and may only consist of replacement of "war material, arms and munitions which have been destroyed, damaged, worn out or used up after the cessation of hostilities … on the basis of piece-for-piece of the same type and with similar characteristics."
It should be noted that the United States was not a party to the Geneva Accords, but it did declare at the Conference in 1954 that "… it will refrain from the threat or the use of force to disturb…" the Accords. Viet Nam, although it was not a signatory of the cease-fire Agreement in question, is, on the other hand, bound by its terms. The Agreement was signed by the Commander in Chief of the French Union Forces (Viet Nam being part of the French Union), and this signature was within the authority of the Commander in Chief. Thus on the strictly legal plane we need be concerned only about a possible violation by the Government of Viet Nam of its obligations.
As a final comment I would point out that the purpose of the introduction has no legal relevance; introduction of U.S. troops for purposes of flood control would still constitute a violation of the Geneva Accords by the Government of Viet Nam. I suggest that if a decision is made to send U.S. troops into Viet Nam, we should justify their introduction on the ground of collective self-defense. Nothing in the Geneva Accords should be read as abridging the interent right of Viet Nam and the United States to take actions in collective self-defense. If you wish, I shall prepare a memorandum on this point.
 | An image should appear at this position in the text. To use the entire page scan as a placeholder, edit this page and replace "{{missing image}}" with "{{raw image|Pentagon-Papers-Part-V-B-4-Book-I.djvu/359}}". Otherwise, if you are able to provide the image then please do so. For guidance, see Wikisource:Image guidelines and Help:Adding images. |  |
GEORGE H. ALDRICH
Office of the Assistant General Counsel
International Affairs
cc: Mr. Wm.McCormick
TOP SECRET
