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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011


TOP SECRET

ASSISTANT SECURITY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON 25, D.C.


INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS
25 November 1961

Refer to: 1-19366/61

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY

SUBJECT: Command Arrangements for Vietnam


Mr. Nitze and I have examined the JCS paper, and believe that it represents the best possible current solution. The following points may be noted:

a. The fact that we have parallel command arrangements in Korea, Taiwan, and Japan should remove most of the possible political disadvantage of having a US "commander" in a situation where Geneva calls for our having only an advisory role.

b. Under the President's letter of May 29, a US "commander" becomes coequal with the Ambassador. (See page 6 of the JCS views for text distinguishing this from the MAAG.)

I recommend that we either elevate General McGarr promptly to the new position, or find a replacement soonest.

Re General Lansdale, General McGarr has sent two messages by special channels reporting disappointment by Diem that no decision has been made on Ed's coming back. (From these and other indications, it is clear that McGarr himself would favor this.) In spite of the importance of Ed's current assignment, I think he belongs in Vietnam, where he is of unique value.

The importance of both these points is underscored by Nolting's negative talks with both Diem and Thuan. We badly need something to sweeten the mixture. You may have seen the report in today's Post (page opposite the editorial page) that the Saigon controlled press has sharply criticized the US, a most novel and disturbing symptom.



William P. Bundy
Acting


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