Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011
TOP SECRET
LIMIT DISTRIBUTION
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION
SUBJECT: Laos
| PARTICIPANTS: | The Secretary | Admiral Arleigh Burke |
| Secretary McNamara | Mr. McGoerge Bundy | |
| Attorney General Kennedy | Assistant Secy McConaughy | |
| The Under Secretary | Deputy Ass. Secy Steeves | |
| General C.E. Le May | Mr. Charles E. Bohlen | |
| General David M. Shoup | Mr. Daniel V. Anderson | |
| Ambassador Kenneth Young | ||
| Mr. G. Edward Reynolds, Lao Desk Officer |
| Copies to: S/S | |||
| C-Mr. Johnson | |||
| S/P Mr. McGhee | EUR-Mr. Kohler | DOD-Secy McNamara | |
| FE-Mr. McConaughy | IO-Mr. Cleveland | Wri-Mr. McGeorge Bundy | |
| S/B Mr. Rohlen | IN/C-2 |
The Secretary observed that the principal change on the ground had been that forces had moved from such points as Muong Kassy and Tha Thom However, there had been no major change that would in itself make the difference between our carrying out Plan 5 today and three weeks ago.
Mr. McNamara said that the re al question was whether we could land forces in Vientiane because of the danger of Chinese air retaliation local sabotage and the action by PL guerrillas who could move into Vientiane at any time. The Secretary observed that the presence of these guerrillas had been noted for weeks.
General Le May observed that there had been a large build-up of supplies by the Pathet Lao side.
Admiral Burke said that we were faced with the "folding" of the FAB, which was not fighting.
The Secretary asked to what extent we were influenced by the movement of Chinese Communist fighter bombers and pointed out that this capability certainly existed three weeks ago.
