Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011
TOP SECRET – Sensitive
Admiral d'Argenlieu, Moutet believed that there could be no negotiations with Ho Chi Minh. He wrote of the "cruel disillusionment of agreements that could not be put into effect...," and he declared that:
- "We can no longer speak of a free agreement between France and Vietnam...."
- "Before any negotiations today, it is necessary to have a military decision. I am sorry, but one cannot commit such madness as the Vietnamese have done with impunity."47
It was the politician's ideas, rather than the general's, which prevailed in Paris. Premier Ramadier — himself a Socialist — spoke of peace in Vietnam, and announced that his government favored independence and unity for Vietnam:
- "Independence within the French Union [and] union of the three Annamese countries, if the Annamese people desire it."48
At the same time, however, his government permitted Admiral d'Argenlieu to launch a military campaign of major proportions and punitive intent.
Very early in the war, the French raised the spectre of Communist conspiracy in Vietnam. Admiral d'Argenlieu in Saigon called for an internationally concerted policy to array the Western powers against the expansion of communism in Asia, beginning with Vietnam. In the National Assembly debated in March, 1947, a Rightist deputy introduced the charge that the violence in Vietnam had been directed from Moscow:
- "Nationalism in Indochina is a means, the end is Soviet imperialism."49
Neither the government nor the people of France heeded General Leclerc's statement of January, 1947:
- "Anti-communism will be a useless tool as long as the problem of nationalism remains unsolved."50
Ho Chi Minh, for his part, issued repeated appeals to France for peace, even offering to withdraw personally:
- "When France recognizes the independence and unity of Vietnam, we will retire to our village, for we are not ambitious for power or honor."51
In February, 1947, the French offered terms to Ho tantamount to unconditional surrender. Ho flatly rejected these, asking the French representative, "If you were in my place, would you accept them?...In the French Union there is no place for cowards. If I accepted these conditions I should be one."52 On 1 March 1947, Ho appealed publicly to
