Page:Pentagon-Papers-Part II.djvu/96

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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011


TOP SECRET – Sensitive

1.  Ho Chi Minh, Selected Works, Vol. III, (Hanoi: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1961), pp. 408–9; Peter V. Curl, ed. Documents on American Foreign Relations 1953, (New York, 1954), p. 162; both as cited in Melvin Gurtov, The First Vietnam Crisis (New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 1967), pp. 18, 48, 171–2.
2.  Telegram from Theodore C. Achilles, deputy chief of mission, Paris, to Dulles No. 2110, November 30, 1953 (CONFIDENTIAL).
3.  Dulles telegram No. 180 to American Embassy – Paris, July 15, 1953, (TOP SECRET) following bilateral talks of July 12. This position was reaffirmed in NSC 177 of December 30, 1953.
4.  See Dulles' September 2, 1953, address to the American legion, in which he said: "We want peace in Indochina, as well as in Korea. The political conference about to be held relates in the first instance to Korea. But growing out of that conference could come, if Red China wants it, an end of aggression and restoration of peace in Indochina. The United States would welcome such a development." Cf. a French memorandum, undated, following tripartite (U.S.–U.K.–France) talks in Washington in July 1953. Here, it is urged that the Chinese representative to the Korean political conference be sounded out on China's intentions toward Indochina. China must be made to conclude "that her best interest is to cut down her support of the Viet Minh, in order to enjoy the benefits which she might expect to derive from a prologned or final cessation of hostilities on the 38th parallel." (CONFIDENTIAL).
5.  New York Herald Tribune, February 19, 1954, p. 3, as quoted in Gurtov, op.cit., p. 76.
6.  Department of State, U.S. Policy on Indochina, 1945 – May 8, 1954, Research Project No. 370, July 1955, p. 11.
7.  According to the Defense Department, Chinese aid was constant at 1000 tons a month from March 1953 to March 1954, with the exceptions of June 1953 (2200 tons) and March 1954 (2500 tons). See memorandum of Robert H. B. Wade (OASD) to Brig. Gen. Bonesteel (OASD, ISA), April 13, 1954 (SECRET).
8.  Dulles reminded Ely that once the U.S. committed any of its armed forces to the war, we would want to have a success, which in turn meant "a greater degree of partnership than had prevailed up to the present time, notably in relation to independence for Associated States and training of indigenous forces." Dulles priority telegram to American Embassy – Paris (eyes only for Ambassador Dillon) No. 3277, March 23, 1954 (TOP SECRET).
B-32
TOP SECRET – Sensitive