Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011
TOP SECRET – Sensitive
III. A. U.S. MILITARY PLANNING AND DIPLOMATIC MANEUVER, JANUARY–JULY 1954
SUMMARY
It is charged that the U.S. tried to sabotage the Geneva Conference, first by maneuvering to prevent the conference from taking place, then by attempting to subvert a settlement, and finally, by refusing to guarantee the resulting agreements of the conference. The documentation on this charge is complete, but by no means unambiguous. While "sabotage" may be a strong word, it is evident that the U.S. by its actions and statements during this period did seek to down-play the conference, disassociate itself from the results, and thereby did cast doubt on the stability of the accords.
After the Big Four Conference at Berlin in February, 1954, U.S. efforts were directed at preventing a French collapse in Vietnam prior to a settlement at Geneva. If the conference were to take place, the U.S. believed that any settlement likely to result would be contrary to U.S. interests. The U.S. aim was, therefore, to take the emphasis off the conference and put it back onto the battlefield. This renewed emphasis on a military approach was put in the context of what Washington referred to as "united action," of the same character as UN intervention in Korea — broad, multilateral, and military. Even as the French–Vietnamese military position continued to deteriorate on the battlefield, the U.S. became more convinced than ever of the need for decisive military victory. The recent experience of Korea only served to convince Washington that meaningful compromise with the communists was impossible. The U.S., however, did have to react to French proposals for a peace conference, and did so by insisting on a strong French stand, bolstered by continued fighting while negotiations were in progress. Moreover, the U.S. threatened to "disassociate" itself from the conference if the results were not favorable to the West (Tab 1).
As the conference became more of a reality, the U.S. aim was to keep the united action option open in the event that France would find the course of negotiations at Geneva unpalatable. Washington was convinced that the conference would fail because of communist intransigence and that, therefore, France would have no choice but to turn to the united action alternative. France wanted U.S. military support, but was reluctant to pay its price. The price was U.S. insistence on complete independence for the Associated States of Indochina as soon as possible. The U.S. would make no pledges to France, moreover, without firm and broad allied support — support which was never forthcoming on the military side. France, unwilling to accept the prerequisites for U.S. intervention, and under domestic pressure, decided to pursue a political settlement at the conference table rather than united military action. Nevertheless, France used these U.S. conditions and the united action option as a lever at the conference. When the French situation in Indochina deteriorated beyond
