Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011
TOP SECRET – Sensitive
| 1. | CIA Study 0017/66, "Asian Communist Employment of Negotiations as a Political Tactic" (S), p. 42. |
| 2. | CIA Study 0017/66 (S), p. 43. |
| 3. | U.S. VerbMin/2, pp. 58 ff. |
| 4. | Ibid., pp. 65–66. |
| 5. | After Dien Bien Phu and the withdrawal of most French forces to the Tonkin Delta, Viet Minh strength in and around the Delta was reported as 94 infantry battalions, 1 artillery division, 110 district companies, and from 40,000 to 50,000 militia. French–Vietnamese strength stood at 109 battalions (of which some 60 percent was VNA) and about 80,000 auxiliary troops and militia. Despite this manpower advantage for the French Union forces, an intelligence estimate for the period said they faced possible defections on a mounting scale which could become very large if the Viet Minh scored major victories or if the French were believed about to abandon Hanoi and portions of the Delta. See NIE-63-4-54, "Probable Military and Political Developments in Indochina over the Next 30 Days (15 June–15 July)," June 15, 1954 (SECRET). In General Valluy's report to the five-power military staff conference on June 4, moreover, he stated, there were no southern Vietnamese who could oppose northern Vietnamese once the Tonkin Delta was lost and defense of the South became necessary. See Dulles' tel. TEDUL 171 to the American Consul – Geneva, June 7, 1954 (TOP SECRET). |
| 6. | U.S. VerbMin/1, pp. 15–16. |
| 7. | IC Restricted/1 (C), p. 8. |
| 8. | CIA Study 0017/66 (S), p. 43. |
| 9. | U.S. VerbMin/5, p. 198. |
| 10. | U.S. VerbMin/5, pp. 216–228; U.S. VerbMin/7, pp. 333–342. |
| 11. | CIA Study 0017/66 (S), p. 44. |
| 12. | IC Restricted/14 (c), pp. 18-19. |
| 13. | IC Restricted/14 (C), p. 9; CIA Study 0017/66 (S), p. 45. |
| 14. | IC Restricted/15 (C), p. 16. |
| 15. | IC Restricted/6 (C), p. 7- |
| 16. | DULTE 187, Geneva to SecState, 16 June 1954 (TOP SECRET) |
C-14
TOP SECRET – Sensitive
