Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011
TOP SECRET – Sensitive
The U.S. members attending the SEATO Military Staff Planners Conference in Pearl Harbor in November, 1955, received basically the same instructions as had been given to earlier planners:
- (1) No acceptance of a permanent "standing group" staff organization.
- (2) No U.S. participation in the development of combined plans.
- (3) No commitment of U.S. forces.49
A demonstration by the U.S. 25th Infantry Division was considered quite impressive by the conference delegates, but did not assuage the appetite among other SEATO nations for strong, concrete U.S. force commitments. The chief U.S. delegate, Rear Admiral A. P. Storrs, recommended to his superiors that the U.S. add "substance" to SEATO by:
- (1) Accepting the concept of a permanent staff organization.
- (2) Accepting the concept of combined planning.
- (3) Maintaining a U.S. division in the Central Pacific.50
Storrs felt that these actions might satisfy the rest of the SEATO nations and quiet their demands for a permanent U.S. force commitment, but he focused on a fading issue. While some SEATO members, especially Australia and New Zealand, kept up an insistence on a stronger organization for the pact, others began to show less and less interest in SEATO per se. By the end of 1955, the U.S. realized that SEATO would fall apart unless something were done to provide a permanent structure. Admitting that the Asian countries were "losing faith" in SEATO, the State Department decided to reexamine the U.S. position pertaining to a permanent staff organization for the SEATO Council.51 A decision for a permanent body of staff planners was taken at a meeting of SEATO Military Advisers in Karachi in March, 1956.52 The advisers agreed on a staff organization headed by a chief of staff with flag rank. Bangkok was selected as the site for SEATO headquarters.
At the ninth conference of SEATO Military Advisers, in February 1959, it was agreed that a series of outline plans for the "introduction of a SEATO force into threatened areas" would be prepared.53 The plans would be based on the assumption that the initial requirement would be for one brigade group or regimental combat team with appropriate naval support. Discussion of a command structure to implement these plans was postponed to a later meeting, over the objections of the Pakistani delegate, who insisted that the time for action was "now":
