Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011
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| 53. | Thus the Joint Chiefs of Staff in 1954: "There are two basic military concepts for the defense of Southeast Asia: a. Static type defense (Korea type), b. An offensive to attack the source of communist military power being applied in Southeast Asia [i.e., China]." It is interesting that in this assessment the Chiefs selected b., although "The force requirements and logistic support...have not been fully developed." Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense from the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Subject: "Defense of Southeast Asia in the Event of Loss of Indochina to the Communists," May 21, 1954 (TS). |
| 54. | C.f., the reports of General O'Daniel following his three missions to Indochina. Following the second mission, O'Daniel reported that "prospects for victory appear increasingly encouraging and I heartily recommend continuation and intensification of United States support." (Progress Report on Military Situation in Indochina as of November 19, 1953 (TS).) Following the third mission, which General Navarre tried unsuccessfully to prevent, O'Daniel was even more optimistic in his remarks, including those on Dien Bien Riu, given the circumstances. (Report of U.S. Special Mission to Indochina, February 5, 1954 (TS)) |
| 55. | Secretary of the Army Robert T. Stevens found it necessary to write, even following the U.S. experiences of the Korean war, "I am becoming increasingly concerned over the frequency of statements by individuals of influence within and without the government that United States air and sea forces alone could solve our problem in Indochina, and equally so over the very evident lack of appreciation of the logistics factors affecting operations in that area." Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense, Subject: Indochina, May 19, 1954 (TS). See also Note 53. |
| 56. | NSC 5405 file of OSD. |
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