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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011
TOP SECRET – Sensitive
| not discussed because of a State–JCS split (Dulles wanted to assume training responsibilities; JCS did not because of political instability, presence of French troops and Geneva restrictions). | ||
| 22 Oct 54 | NSC Action Program | The US decided to take firmer steps to strengthen Diem, to tell Paris that French support had been inadequate. An earlier JCS concession to consider a training program for the NVA opened the way for the decision to inaugurate a "limited" US role in military affairs. |
| 24 Oct 54 | Eisenhower letter to Diem | Announced direct economic aid and military assistance from the US; demanded no Vietnamese moves as reciprocation for aid. France called it a carte americaine, said it violated the principle of joint action adopted in September. |
| 8 Nov 54 | Collins Mission | General J. Lawton Collins, given broad authority to coordinate all US programs and — with French support — get things moving, arrived in Vietnam. |
| 13 Dec 54 | Collins–Ely Minute of Understanding | France will grant full autonomy to the VM by July 1955, the US will assume training responsibilities, the US MAAG, Indochina, will direct the training program — under General Ely's overall authority. French and US instructors will be phased out as VNA efficiency increases. Washington approved the Minute; Paris objected, particularly to the phase-out of French trainers. France did not relent and consent until 11 February 1955. |
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TOP SECRET – Sensitive
