Page:Pentagon-Papers-Part IV. A. 3.djvu/14

From Wikisource
Jump to navigation Jump to search
This page has been proofread, but needs to be validated.

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

TOP SECRET – Sensitive

not discussed because of a State–JCS split (Dulles wanted to assume training responsibilities; JCS did not because of political instability, presence of French troops and Geneva restrictions).
22 Oct 54 NSC Action Program The US decided to take firmer steps to strengthen Diem, to tell Paris that French support had been inadequate. An earlier JCS concession to consider a training program for the NVA opened the way for the decision to inaugurate a "limited" US role in military affairs.
24 Oct 54 Eisenhower letter to Diem Announced direct economic aid and military assistance from the US; demanded no Vietnamese moves as reciprocation for aid. France called it a carte americaine, said it violated the principle of joint action adopted in September.
8 Nov 54 Collins Mission General J. Lawton Collins, given broad authority to coordinate all US programs and — with French support — get things moving, arrived in Vietnam.
13 Dec 54 Collins–Ely Minute of Understanding France will grant full autonomy to the VM by July 1955, the US will assume training responsibilities, the US MAAG, Indochina, will direct the training program — under General Ely's overall authority. French and US instructors will be phased out as VNA efficiency increases. Washington approved the Minute; Paris objected, particularly to the phase-out of French trainers. France did not relent and consent until 11 February 1955.
TOP SECRET – Sensitive