Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011
NSC 5429/2, which provided for the maintenance of forces in Indochina as necessary to assure the internal security of the area, the NSC had apparently decided the issue in favor of the Secretary of State, the disagreement between State and Defense continued with an additional dispute concerning the level of forces to be maintained. In agreeing to train Cambodian forces, the JCS in effect reasserted their earlier position vis-a-vis Vietnam:
- However, the Joint Chiefs of Staff note with concern the unstable political situation presently existing within the state of South Vietnam, and accordingly consider that this is not a propitious time to further indicate United States intentions with respect to the support and training of either the Vietnamese regular or police forces. Accordingly, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend against the assignment of a training mission to MAAG Saigon.21
In recommending force levels for Vietnam, the JCS reiterated the above recommendation and pointed out that the US MAAG would be limited by the Geneva cease-fire agreement, that "the development of the proposed forces...will require extensive and detailed training which will extend over a period of 3 to 5 years," and that "in view of the uncertain capabilities of the French and Vietnamese to retrieve, retain, and reorganize the dispersed forces of Vietnam, it may be several years before an effective military force will exist. Therefore, U.S. military support to that area, including the training and equipping of forces, should be accomplished at low priority and not at the expense of other U.S. military programs and should not be permitted to impair the development through MDA programs of effective and reliable forces elsewhere."22
The JCS proposed Vietnamese forces of 184,000 (5 divisions of light infantry including one light artillery battalion per division—41,000; 12 regiments—24,000; gendarmerie—9,000; Headquarters, Service and Support forces—110,000), a militia of 50,000, and a small air force and navy, and proposed that "French forces consisting of a minimum of 4 divisions...should be retained in this country until phased out by U.S.-trained Viet Nam units."23
The Secretary of State, still believing in the need for a U.S. training mission, disagreed with the force levels proposed by the JCS, considering them excessive to the requirement of maintaining internal security as expressed in NSC 5429/2.24 On 19 October the JCS argued that their force proposals were justified by the ultimate objectives of the forces of Vietnam and repeated their opposition, from a military point of view, to U.S. participation in the training of Vietnamese forces. Their memorandum concluded, however, by providing the concession the Department of State must have so eagerly sought:
