Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011
Thus, although U.S. defense policy in the mid-1950's called for main but not sole reliance on nuclear weapons, and on use of massive retaliatory power in response to acts deemed hostile to the interests of the United States, definition of and planning for use of such weapons, in retaliation or otherwise, were so ambiguous, and the concepts themselves so unclear that, particularly when applied to specific remote local defense situations, their value as guidance was virtually nil.
2. The nature of SEATO, and of U.S. views concerning fulfillment of its obligations under the SEATO treaty, necessarily reflected the confusion in overall U.S. defense policy and planning. Added to this general problem was the more specific matter of matching U.S. resources to the worldwide commitments, including SEATO, that had been assumed since the end of World War II. Thus the Joint Chiefs stated that "U.S. commitments to Formosa, Japan and Korea, which nations have been excluded from the [SEATO] treaty, make it imperative that the United States not be restricted by force commitments in the subject treaty area;56 to these commitments must be added the numberous U.S. obligations outside Asia.
As is well-known, the.SEATO treaty, pressured into existence by the United States and intended to deter overt aggression by China or other Communist nations, relied heavily in concept on the military participation of the U.S. Faced with the magnitude of U.S. commitments, particularly in relation to the capabilities of the defense establishment, and continually confronted by the considerations and requirements of general war, the JCS sought a way in which U.S. SEATO obligations might be carried out:
- 5. a. Continued development of combat effective indigenous forces, with their structure and training mutually coordinated to develop local leadership and prestige, and with improved capabilities to create a cohesive fighting force through integration of their operations with adjacent indigenous forces and with support by operations of forces of other Manila Pact members.
- b. Readiness to retaliate promptly with attacks by the most effective combination of U.S. armed forces against the military power of the aggressor.
- c. Encouragement of other Manila Pact countries to maintain forces in readiness to counter aggression.
- d. Discussion, in general terms, of unilateral military plans by the Military Representatives to the Council to the extent necessary to insure maximum participation and cooperation by other member nations but not to the extent that U.S. strategic plans or the availability of U.S. forces for implementing such plans might be revealed.
