Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011
Although at this stage MAAG was charged solely with the task of assisting the Vietnamese to develop a force capable of establishing and maintaining internal security, the second mission of limited resistance to an onslaught from the north was reflected in General Collins recommendations of 15 November. In recommending a force level of some 88,000, General Collins indicated his belief that divisional combat elements should be included in the force structure to assist the FEC to absorb the shock of invasion if hostilities were renewed as well as, if called upon, to reinforce the security troops in pacification activities. General Collins also contended that to reduce the VNA by half without at the same time providing forces organized for combat rather than merely for security duty was certain to have a bad effect on Vietnamese morale.78
Accordingly, General Collins recommended that the U.S. support a small, well-balanced force including 13 security regiments and an airborne RCT for internal security purposes and a three-field-division force to delay any Communist invasion until external assistance from the Manila powers could arrive. A small navy and air force were recommended to complete the Vietnamese defense establishment.79
On 17 November the JCS approved Collins' recommendations, emphasizing, however, that this program "does not provide adequate security for the Associated States against external aggression after the withdrawal of the French forces. With the Viet Minh increasing the size and effectiveness of their forces and with no force in being committed to mutual defense under the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty, the above long-range program would be insufficient to provide more than limited initial resistance to an organized military assault by the Viet Minh."80 In his report of 20 January, Collins expanded on this recommended force structure, a structure "based on the concept that a relatively small force, properly trained, equipped and led can perform the above missions more effectively and at less cost than a larger force which would be disproportionate to the economic and manpower capacities of the country."81
The task of assuring that Vietnamese forces were properly trained, equipped, and led fell initially to the Training Relations Instruction Mission (TRIM), a joint U.S.–French enterprise under USMAAG Chief 0'Daniel. Although the Collins-Ely minute of understanding did not go into effect until 12 February 1955, 0'Daniel had begun to implement that agreement in 1954 by organizing TRIM, which consisted of all French and U.S. advisory and training personnel as well as French cadres with Vietnamese units, for this purpose.82 During 1955 TRIM occupied itself with organizing a military school system, setting up programs for training officers and specialists in the U.S. and other countries, and reducing the language barrier. Much time and thought went into planning for reorganising and training the army on a divisional rather than a battalion basis, but TRIM accomplished little in this area during
